British conflict researcher: “Almost all the prerequisites for civil wars in Western Europe are met”

The terms "civil war" and "Western Europe" don't really fit together—at least not in the common imagination of the inhabitants of these orderly latitudes. But that's precisely what's misleading, says David Betz. The professor at King's College London studies the conditions for civil wars and armed uprisings. He assumes that such conflicts could occur in our part of the world in the coming years. This makes him one of the very few researchers in his discipline to say so publicly. But behind closed doors, many of his colleagues are talking about it, says Betz. In a video call from his university office, he explained how things could have come to this, what to expect, and whether these terrifying scenarios can be prevented.

Professor Betz, when we talk about wars these days, we're talking about the conflicts between Israel and Iran or Russia and Ukraine. However, you consider a potential civil war to be the real threat. Why?

Because in Western Europe today, almost all the structural prerequisites for civil war are met—in a form that the academic literature would describe as almost "ideal-typical." We are talking about factors that have been researched for decades: deep social divisions, an accelerated loss of status among the once dominant majority population, and a dramatic collapse of trust in institutions.

Let's start with the division. What exactly does that mean?

Political debates used to be anchored on substantive issues – today, identity and group affiliation determine thinking. "Polarized factionalization" is particularly dangerous: people are guided not by content, but by the line of their own "tribal community." This can be seen throughout Europe, but most clearly in ethnically oriented parties. In Great Britain, there is now a growing Muslim political movement that is effectively a single-issue party – focusing on international Muslim interests, currently primarily Gaza, while British domestic politics receives little attention. This is an expression of a politics in which identity is more important than anything else.

A second factor is the loss of status of the majority population – what does that mean?

Researchers refer to this as "downgrading": the formerly dominant cultural and political majority is rapidly losing its position. In several European countries, the native population will become a minority within their own country within a generation. In the United Kingdom, this is expected to happen around 2060, and sooner or later in other countries. Downgrading means that the language, values, and political priorities of this (soon to be former) majority no longer set the tone—just as in historical cultural displacements, such as the Celtic Britons by Anglo-Saxon settlers.

“Mass immigration is not a project of the population, but of the elites”

Some would say: If democratically elected governments allow this, then it is the will of the majority.

This is a fallacy. Mass immigration is not a project of the population, but of the elites. In Great Britain, there has never been an election in which voters consciously opted for unlimited migration. Officially, the message was always "control and limitation" – in reality, the "tap" was turned on full. These elites – political, economic, media, academic – are post-national. For them, nation and borders are anachronisms, and progress means removing all barriers to the flow of people, capital, and ideas.

And the loss of trust?

Trust is the social capital of a society. For decades, it has been systematically eroded – in politics, the media, the police, the judiciary, even the church and medicine. Today, politicians as a group in many countries enjoy only single-digit percentage trust. But without trust, the ability to resolve conflicts peacefully declines. Societies can thus become "socially bankrupt" – just as companies can become financially bankrupt.

What role do economic developments play?

Very high prosperity, good governance, and a reasonably unified elite have historically been the best shields against civil wars. But these three pillars are under threat in the Western world: productivity and innovation have stagnated for decades, and bureaucracy is paralyzing the entire apparatus. At the same time, debt is growing explosively. Germany, for example, was once a model of fiscal discipline; today, hundreds of billions or even trillions of euros are borrowed in a short space of time. Energy and industrial policies are destroying competitiveness – Germany no longer relies on Russian energy sources, while losing key export markets like China. In addition, young people are significantly worse off than their parents in terms of income, home ownership, starting a family, and retirement planning; in some cases, life expectancy is even declining. This undermines the deeply rooted Western promise that children will be better off materially.

What social causes do you see?

Multiculturalism and identity politics have destroyed the common ground a democracy needs. There used to be a stable "we" – today, an "us versus them" pattern dominates. This is reinforced by social media, which isolates and polarizes. Symptoms of so-called feral cities are already emerging in major cities: decaying infrastructure, areas without effective police presence or only "negotiated" police presence, growing private security services, walls and bars in front of houses. Such developments are driving ethnically motivated outflow – those who can move to where they see "their people."

And who would face each other in a possible civil war?

Two main axes: First, nationalists versus post-nationalists—essentially a revolt of the "governed" against elites who are changing the rules of the game to their disadvantage. Second, natives versus newcomers. The first conflict could resemble a Latin American "dirty war"—targeted assassinations of members of the elite and counterattacks by state or private security forces. Think of helicopter flights out to sea with no return for some passengers. The second would be more widespread, with urban violence of the kind we already know in some form.

“Established research”

Who would win in the end?

In the long run, the national idea will prevail because post-nationalism is neither economically nor socially viable. But the price would be enormous: countless deaths, destroyed infrastructure, decades of reconstruction. It can be compared to the collapse of the Soviet Union—only probably with more violence.

In your essays you speak of sudden tipping points.

Yes. In 1990, 90 percent of people in Bosnia still considered their relations with other ethnic groups to be good. Two years later, Yugoslavia had collapsed, and massacres, torture, and expulsions followed. The deceptive calm before the storm is called normalcy bias—people think that because everything works today, it will be the same tomorrow.

Some say such warnings come primarily from the right.

This is too simplistic. Even left-wing theorists, such as those in the French text "The Coming Insurrection" ( L'Insurrection qui vient ), develop scenarios for how to trigger chaos through attacks on urban infrastructure in order to seize political power. Migration as a trigger for conflict affects working-class neighborhoods as much as conservative milieus. And when elites try to ignore these tensions, the willingness to resort to violence grows on all sides.

You are one of the few researchers who openly address the threat of civil wars here in Western Europe. Why don't your colleagues do this?

My theses are based on established research—Barbara Walter, Robert Putnam, Monica Duffy Toft. The assumption that the West is "immune" to civil war is scientifically untenable. Many colleagues in the field see similar risks, but only speak out behind closed doors.

How high is the risk exactly?

If I go by my gut feeling: high, probably within the next five years. This has to do with the fact that I see no political signs of a serious solution to the problem – neither leaders with the will nor the ability to change course. If we look at it statistically, I rely on the work of political scientist Barbara Walter. Based on global data, she calculated that in a country where the structural conditions for civil war are met, the annual probability of occurrence is around 4 percent. Extrapolating that over five years, the cumulative probability is around 18.5 percent. This means: Even if it doesn't happen in the first year, the risk remains in each subsequent year and accumulates.

Added to this is another factor from the civil war literature: civil wars often "spread" to neighboring countries. If such a conflict breaks out in a European country—let's take France as an example—then the probability is high that the unrest will spread to neighboring states. Walter doesn't give a fixed percentage for this, but if one conservatively assumes 50 percent and extrapolates this chain reaction to a group of ten countries with the same risk factors, the five-year probability in the European context rises slightly to 60 percent or more.

Are you personally preparing for a civil war scenario?

I'm not a prepper, I don't have weapons, and I'm not building a fortress. My job is to understand the situation and speak about it publicly. Those who want to prepare practically can find plenty of advice from specialized organizations. My hope is that through education, enough people and ideas will come together to perhaps find a more peaceful way forward—even if I'm not overly optimistic.

Thank you for the interview.